Where Did All These Passports Come From? Russia’s Manipulation of Citizenship as Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine

Even long before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Kremlin employed various “hybrid” methods to extend its influence within Ukrainian territory, including by cultivating allies in Ukrainian government circles in the years after the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union and by supporting oligarchs in their drive for control over sectors of Ukraine’s economy. With its 2014 capture of Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine and subsequent full-scale invasion eight years later, it has manipulated citizenship and the granting of Russian passports in various ways to justify its invasion and consolidate control over occupied Ukrainian territory. These tactics of hybrid warfare have significantly supplemented the power of Russia’s conventional military operations to exert political and administrative control over occupied populations.

This Russian policy of “passportization” — meaning the mass, expedited conferral of citizenship through the distribution of passports — is a critical tool in Russia’s effort to lure or subjugate populations. The Russian interior minister asserted in March 2025 that 3.5 million residents of occupied Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the east and other occupied Ukrainian territory that the Kremlin calls by the imperial-era term “Novorossiya” (New Russia) have received Russian passports. The practice and the strategic objectives underlying this practice have severe implications for international law, future peace negotiations, and European security.

Early Post-Soviet Use of `Passportization’

Russia has long used citizenship policy as an instrument of influence in the post-Soviet space. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moscow has used passportization to advance its vision of the “Russkiy Mir” or “Russian World.” Passportization began in the 1990s initially as an incentive to encourage residents in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia to turn in their Soviet passports in exchange for Russian passports and citizenship. By 2008, more than 90 percent of residents in the two regions accepted Russian citizenship, a factor that the Kremlin then used as justification for its invasion that August to “protect” Russian citizens.

A similar situation to Georgia unfolded in Crimea. During the 1990s in Crimea, the program was relatively small and those in the region that accepted Russian citizenship was in the thousands. Many at the time viewed the offer as a way to gain visa-free travel to Russia. However, this early offer later changed to concrete law. After the Russian occupation of Crimea and the Donbas in 2014, Russian policy mandated that all permanent residents accept Russian citizenship. Like Georgia, this set the pretext to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Origin of Russia’s Citizenship Policy as a Means for Population Control

Russian citizenship laws have evolved in ways that simplify citizenship acquisition for residents of former Soviet states while simultaneously making renunciation of Russian citizenship increasingly difficult. Modern Russian citizenship policy began with the 2002 “Law on Citizenship.” Initially, the law imposed stricter naturalization requirements, including proof of income, residency, and Russian language proficiency. However, the legislation also created simplified pathways for certain groups, including former Soviet citizens and those left stateless for various reasons by the dissolution of the USSR.

Russia quickly demonstrated how citizenship policy could serve its geopolitical objectives. In the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which sought to secede from Georgia starting in the early 1990s, many residents lacked internationally recognized citizenship. Russia streamlined the naturalization process for these populations. The Kremlin then later used the presence of Russian citizens in the region to justify military force against Georgia in 2008, using the narrative that the Georgian government was somehow threatening Russian citizens.

Another important aspect of the 2002 law involved renunciation restrictions. Russia prohibited citizens from renouncing Russian citizenship if they possessed “outstanding obligations” to the Russian Federation, were under criminal investigation, or lacked another nationality. Because the law left “outstanding obligations” vague and open to interpretation, the Russian government retained broad discretion over who could relinquish citizenship.

In 2007, Russia reintroduced widespread use of the internal passport system, similar to a national identification card. The internal passport is a separate document that comes after obtaining Russian citizenship (an external passport). Those who either voluntarily or forcefully obtain citizenship then must obtain an internal passport. Historically, internal passports in Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union functioned as instruments of social control by regulating movement, residence, and employment — citizens were required to use them for many forms of domestic travel, to register their official place of residence with the government, and to gain access to state services such as marriage, education, and health care.  This largely remains the case today, as the document identifies one’s place of birth and place of residence, and it dictates where one can travel within Russia and can act as a barrier to employment. The mass conferral of external passports are the means that Russia uses to expand citizenship abroad while internal passports are a control mechanism within the country and occupied territory.

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russian citizenship law was further expanded to accelerate the conferral of citizenship to residents of Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk. Presidential decrees simplified naturalization procedures by removing requirements such as language proficiency and years of residency within Russia. At the same time, Russia imposed additional scrutiny on dual citizens, including in the occupied territories, by requiring Russian citizens to report any other citizenship or other residency within 60 days. Although the policy did not formally prohibit dual citizenship, it restricted access to employment, travel, and government services for those who wished to keep Ukrainian citizenship.

Russia once again expanded these measures with the 2023 citizenship law, which overwrote the 2002 law and was more explicitly oriented toward occupied Ukrainian territory. The 2023 law simplified naturalization pathways for residents of former Soviet territories while also making renunciation of Russian citizenship even more difficult. Since Ukraine does not recognize dual citizenship with Russia, this forces Ukrainians in occupied territory to choose or potentially face statelessness, with the further implication that it becomes more difficult for Ukrainians who are essentially forced to choose Russian citizenship to re-integrate into Ukraine should the territory revert after the war.

The legislation dramatically expanded the category of obligations preventing renunciation to include taxes, fees, or fines still due, as well as military obligations. Military service requirements became particularly significant. Men between the ages of 18 and 30 generally cannot renounce Russian citizenship unless they complete compulsory military service or obtain an exemption. As a result, Ukrainians who acquire Russian citizenship, either coerced or voluntarily, may become legally obligated to support or participate in Russia’s war effort to insulate the core Russian population.

Russia’s Use of Passportization in Ukraine

Passportization operates alongside Russia’s broader citizenship policies to facilitate what amounts to an administrative conquest of occupied Ukrainian territory. While the 2002 citizenship law established the legal foundation for passportization, the 2023 update significantly expanded Russia’s ability to impose citizenship in occupied Ukraine. Over time, Russia has increasingly relied on coercive methods that either directly or indirectly pressure Ukrainians to acquire Russian citizenship and internal passports. One of Russia’s primary methods involves restricting access to essential services for residents who refuse Russian citizenship. Although Russia often presents passportization as voluntary, conditions in occupied territories make it increasingly difficult to function without Russian documentation.

Following the 2014 citizenship law changes, Ukrainians in Russian-controlled territory who held dual citizenship faced increasing restrictions related to work, travel, and access to state services. Since 2022, Russian occupation authorities have reportedly expanded these measures to include restrictions on access to humanitarian aid, medical care, pensions, education, employment, and property ownership. One example emerged following the June 2023 Russian destruction of Kakhovka Dam, causing severe flooding in occupied as well as unoccupied portions of Kherson Oblast in Ukraine’s southeast. Reports indicated that residents in occupied areas without Russian citizenship faced delays or denial of evacuation assistance and humanitarian aid. Similar pressure has reportedly been applied to residents in occupied territory seeking access to utilities and subsidized heating fuel in the winter. While these measures may not formally compel citizenship acquisition, they create powerful incentives for residents to accept Russian passports to maintain access to basic services and for economic survival.

Russia has also increasingly employed explicit legal coercion. In conjunction with the 2023 citizenship law, President Vladimir Putin issued a decree requiring residents of occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia to either obtain Russian citizenship or risk being treated as foreigners residing illegally on Russian territory. These policies create a precarious legal environment for the estimated 6 million Ukrainians in occupied territory. Ukraine does not recognize Russian passportization or forced renunciation of Ukrainian citizenship. However, residents who refuse Russian citizenship risk economic marginalization, detention, or expulsion by occupation authorities. At the same time, even those who acquire Russian citizenship may remain vulnerable. Individuals accused of supporting Ukraine, using Ukrainian documents, or resisting Russian military obligations may face denationalization, criminal prosecution, or deportation.

Russia has also used passportization as part of a broader effort to reshape the demographics of occupied territory. Since 2022, Russian authorities have encouraged some newly naturalized Ukrainians to relocate deeper into Russia while incentivizing Russian citizens to settle in occupied Ukrainian territory through incentives such as housing subsidies and favorable mortgage rates. These practices resemble historical Soviet population-transfer policies designed to suppress nationalist identities and strengthen Moscow’s control. The transfer of Ukrainian children into Russia has generated particular international concern, and even prompted the International Criminal Court to issue arrest warrants in March 2023 for Putin and his commissioner for children’s rights. Russian policies accelerating citizenship for orphaned Ukrainian children and facilitating adoption by Russian families have been criticized as efforts to erase Ukrainian identity and assimilate children into Russian society. The scale of the campaign demonstrates the central role passportization plays in Russia’s broader occupation strategy.

Russian Strategic Goals in Ukraine

Passportization serves several major Russian strategic objectives in Ukraine. First, it helps consolidate administrative control over occupied territory. By transforming Ukrainians into Russian citizens, Moscow extends Russian legal jurisdiction over occupied populations and integrates them into Russian political and bureaucratic structures. Regardless of the legitimacy of the campaign, residents become subject to Russian laws, taxation systems, surveillance mechanisms, and military obligations.

In practice, everyday life within occupied territory increasingly becomes tied to Russian institutions rather than Ukrainian ones. The longer occupied territory remains integrated into Russia’s administrative systems, the more difficult it becomes for Ukraine to restore legal and political authority, as Russia may claim that occupied regions are functionally part of the Russian state and populated by Russian citizens rather than Ukrainians. Even in the event of a future withdrawal, years of administrative subjugation, demographic changes, and coerced citizenship could leave populations trapped in a limbo between Ukrainian and Russian legal and political status.

Second, passportization supports the Kremlin’s broader ideological concept of the “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir). Putin has repeatedly questioned the distinction between Russian and Ukrainian national identity, particularly in his 2021 essay “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians.” Within this framework, passportization helps legitimize annexation by reinforcing the Kremlin’s narrative that Ukrainians and Russians constitute a single historical and civilizational community rather than distinct peoples. By distributing Russian citizenship throughout occupied territory, Moscow attempts to blur the legal and cultural distinction between Russia and Ukraine while presenting annexation as a form of reunification rather than conquest.

Russia has repeatedly used the presence of Russian citizens abroad as justification for intervention in neighboring states under the claim that it must protect compatriots facing alleged discrimination or persecution. As noted above, such narratives were employed in Georgia in 2008 after Russia distributed passports in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, then in Crimea and Donbas in 2014. In both cases, passportization helped create both a political pretext for intervention and a mechanism for expanding long-term Russian influence in contested territory. Russia also has extended its passportization campaign to Moldova’s Russia-aligned Transnistria region, where most residents hold Russian citizenship even though only 28 percent are Russian speakers. If Ukraine were to lose the war, Russia’s repeated actions signal it might use the same pretext for an invasion of Moldova.

Third, passportization helps address Russia’s demographic and military pressures. Russia faces long-term demographic decline, labor shortages, and growing wartime manpower demands. Integrating occupied populations into the Russian state provides an expanded labor force and additional pools for military recruitment. Reports indicate that some newly naturalized citizens have faced pressure to support Russia’s defense industries or military operations. While Russia publicly insists it does not target new citizens for conscription, the broader legal framework permits the state to impose military obligations on naturalized citizens.

Using newly naturalized populations to supplement the war effort may also help reduce political backlash among Russia’s core population. Since the start of the war, the Kremlin has attempted to insulate segments of the Russian population from the deadly costs of mobilization — a January 2026 estimate by the Center for Strategic and International Studies put the number of Russians killed in the Ukraine war at 325,000. By relying more heavily on residents of occupied territories, migrants, ethnic minorities, and foreign recruits, Russian can sustain manpower requirements while limiting the political risks associated with large-scale mobilization of core Russian populations.

Implications for International Law and European Security

The forcible conferral of citizenship by an occupying power, coercive pressure to renounce nationality, deportation of civilians, and population transfers all implicate provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention and broader international humanitarian law governing occupation. Hostile changes to demographic composition and the legal status of occupied territory, for instance, are prohibited. However, in this realm, Putin remains relatively unchallenged. Despite the ICC arrest warrant, Putin in September 2024 was able to visit Mongolia, a state party to the ICC. Putin continues to lengthen his list of offenses through passportization, only strengthening the Kremlin’s hold on occupied Ukraine.

Passportization additionally creates major challenges for any future peace settlement. As occupation continues, increasing numbers of Ukrainians in occupied territory may possess Russian citizenship and documentation. Any future negotiations regarding territorial status, repatriation, or reintegration will therefore involve contested questions regarding nationality, political allegiance, and legal identity. Even if and when Ukraine eventually regains control of occupied territory, reversing years of administrative integration and demographic transformation would likely prove extremely difficult. The broader security implications extend beyond Ukraine. If Russia successfully normalizes citizenship manipulation as an instrument of territorial expansion, other post-Soviet states with Russian-speaking populations or separatist regions may face similar pressure, as Putin desires to establish a Russian sphere of influence.

Conclusion

Russia’s passportization campaign in Ukraine demonstrates how citizenship policy can function as a modern instrument of hybrid warfare and territorial conquest. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin has gradually transformed citizenship law into a geopolitical tool capable of extending Russian influence beyond its borders. In occupied Ukraine, passportization now operates alongside military occupation, coercive governance, and demographic engineering to facilitate long-term integration into the Russian state.

Passportization matters not simply because it changes documentation status, but because it reshapes sovereignty, identity, and political control. Through administrative means, Russia seeks to weaken Ukraine’s legal and cultural ties to occupied territory while embedding those regions within Russian systems. As the conflict continues, the long-term effects of passportization may become increasingly difficult to reverse. Understanding passportization is therefore essential not only for Russia’s current war in Ukraine, but also for how modern authoritarian states may increasingly weaponize citizenship itself as a tool of warfare.

FEATURED IMAGE: Passports of the Russian Federation lie on a table as Crimean residents receive them in Simferopol, on April 15, 2014. Moscow had annexed Crimea the previous month after deploying military forces there and backing a hasty local referendum calling for the Black Sea peninsula to be absorbed into the Russian Federation. (Photo by MAX VETROV/AFP via Getty Images)

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